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Startle and surprise on the flight deck is a contributing factor in multiple aviation
accidents that have been recognized by multiple aviation safety boards. This study
identified the effects startle and surprise had on commercial pilots with single and multiengine ratings. Surprise is defined here as something unexpected (e.g., engine failure),
while startle is the associated exaggerated effect of an unexpected condition (e.g., thunder
sound). Forty pilots were tested in a basic aviation training device configured to a Cessna
172 (single-engine) and a Baron 58 (multi-engine). Each pilot flew the single- and multiengine aircraft in a scenario that induced an uninformed surprise emergency condition,
uninformed surprise and startle emergency condition, and an informed emergency
condition. During each condition, heart and respiration rate, flight performance, and
subjective workload measures were collected. The startle and surprise condition showed
the highest heart and respiration rates for both aircraft. However, there was no difference
in either the heart or respiration rates between the two aircraft for the informed condition.
The subjective measures of mental, physical, and temporal demands, effort, and
frustration were higher for the twin-engine aircraft when compared to the single-engine
aircraft for all conditions. Performance (subjective) was not different between the single-
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and multi-engine aircraft for the surprise condition only. Objective flight performance,
which was evaluated as a) participants’ adherence to the engine failure checklist steps for
single-engine aircraft; and b) altitude deviation for multi-engine aircraft, showed that
pilots performed better in the informed emergency condition. Startle and surprise can be
measured using heart and respiration rate as physiological markers, which can be used to
evaluate if different flight simulator scenarios are startling, surprising, or neither.
Potential applications of this study will help develop flight simulator scenarios for
various unexpected conditions of different aircraft. Results of this study can potentially
help pave the way for federal regulations that require training for startle and surprise.
Keywords: unexpected events, workload, vital signs, commercial pilots, training
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Chapter I
Introduction
The behavior of pilots in most Loss of Control-In Fight (LOC-1) accidents is
unexplained (Federal Aviation Administration [FAA], 2017; National Transportation
Safety Board [NTSB], 2010). In recent years after the crash of Air France 447 (AF447)
and Colgan Air (CA3407), investigators have concluded that surprise and startle can
disrupt the ability of most pilots to respond to an unexpected event. It is recommended to
develop simulator scenarios that can surprise and startle pilots, and such scenarios to be
used for training (FAA, 2017).
The terms startle and surprise are often used interchangeably in aviation
operational practice (Rivera, Talone, Boesser, Jentsch, & Yeh, 2014). However, several
authors have pointed out that startle and surprise are inherently different responses
resulting from a different cause and effect (Martin, Murrary, Bates, & Lee, 2015; Rivera
et al., 2014). The NTSB (2010) report on Colgan CA3407 and Bureau d'Enquêtes et
d'Analyses (BEA; 2012) report on Air France (AF447) crash used “surprise” and “startle”
as different terminologies.
Surprise is a cognitive-emotional response to an unexpected event that contradicts
one’s expectation, thus, forcing the person to change his or her understanding of the
situation (Foster & Keane, 2015; Horstmann, 2006; Schützwohl, 1998; Niepel, Rudolph,
& Schützwohl, 1998). Startle is a brief and highly physiological reaction to a sudden or
threating stimulus, such as the sound of a gunshot (Martin et al., 2015; Thackray, 1988).
According to Landman, Groen, van Paassen, Bronkhorst, and Mulder (2017a), eye blinks,
contraction of the neck and facial muscles, the arrest of ongoing behavior, and report of
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anger or fear are measurable aspects of startle.
The cause and effect of surprise and startle also differ. For instance, a person can
be surprised and startled at the same time, but the same person can also be surprised in
the absence of a startle. Alternately, lightning strikes when flying through bad weather
can be startling but not surprising. Even though studies indicate that surprises are
common in the aviation industry, most of these events are not significant (de Boer &
Hurts, 2017; Kochan, Breiter, & Jentsch, 2004). However, Landman et al. (2017a)
suggested that surprise may impair the pilot’s problem-solving abilities in some cases.
The crashes of AF447, CA3407, and Turkish Airlines Flight 1951 (TA1951) in
2009 were the main reason for the introduction of the term startle in aviation. In the
aftermath of the CA3407 accident, the NTSB (2010) mentioned startle as one of the
contributing causes of the accident. According to the NTSB (2010), the pilot was startled
by the activation of the stick shaker, which led to confusion in the cockpit. Surprise has
been a factor in airline accidents for more than three decades, having been mentioned in
multiple accident reports. However, startle is a new concept in aviation, which was the
center of debate after multiple crashes in 2009 (BEA, 2012; NTSB, 2010).
In a Notice of Proposed Rule Making (NPRM), the FAA (2014) proposed
changes in the evaluation of certain training maneuvers in the Flight Simulation Training
Devices (FTSD). It was presumed that training in realistic scenarios would help diminish
the startle effect. Congruently, the FAA (2013) postulated that the goal of startle training
is to provide pilots with startle experience, which, in turn, would allow for the effective
recovery of the aircraft during emergencies. They ascertained that the physiological
response of startle is difficult to re-create in a simulated training environment, while
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surprise can easily be created. They further suggested that surprise may lead up to startle
if certain parameters are introduced at the right time. The FAA (2017) acknowledges that
startle and surprise have been key factors in multiple Loss of Control In-Flight (LOC-I)
accidents.
Statement of the Problem
According to Casner, Geven & Williams (2013), airline training events are highly
scripted and predictable, which calls into question the abilities of pilots to recognize and
respond to abnormal events. Similarly, BEA (2012) found that airline crews receive little
training on how to manage a sudden and stressful event that requires quick and precise
decision-making, while Casner et al. (2013) found that pilots are required by regulations
to practice each abnormal event in training before the actual flight. Hence the pilots can
anticipate that an unusual event will occur during the training.
Congruently, Moriarty (2015) found that pilots are accustomed to the idea that
they will rarely face an emergency in their carrier, so to quickly transition from this
presumed level of safety to a confusing (difficult) and life-threatening flight condition
can startle and surprise pilots. While they are trained for emergencies, there are ample
combinations of circumstances that pilots cannot train during simulator practice.
According to Landman et al. (2017a), unexpected events induce a startling effect that
may significantly impair performance. Situations that require human intervention usually
are unanticipated, demanding quick and correct decision making.
Presently, no study has recorded the heart rate (HR) and respiration rate (RR) of
pilots during events that can be surprising and startling. In addition, few studies have
evaluated pilot performance during a startling event (Gillen, 2016; Martin et al., 2015),
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while few studies evaluated performance during events that were surprising (Kochan et
al., 2004; Rankin, Woltjer & Field, 2016). However, in all these studies, there was no
evidence to substantiate that the scenario was startling or surprising for the participants.
Similarly, the workload during startle and surprise events in most cases will increase, but
no study has evaluated workload during the aforementioned situations.
Purpose Statement
The purpose of this study was to assess the differences in the physiological
response and performance between startle and surprise conditions. Heart rate and
respiration rate were recorded to validate if the scenario was able to startle and surprise
pilots. The study compared the scenarios for two aircraft (single-engine and multiengine). The researcher also evaluated pilots’ self-assessment of workload during startle
and surprise events using the National Aeronautics and Space Administration Task Load
Index (NASA-TLX).
Significance of the Study
The review and analysis of the Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS) safety
database revealed that the term “startle” was mentioned in 134 coded reports, while the
term “surprise” was mentioned in 904 coded reports (Rivera et al., 2014). The European
Air Safety Agency (EASA) in Notice of Proposed Amendment (NPM) (2014) addressed
the need for surprise and startle training. The training should address unexpected and
stressful situations and prepare the crew to master these sudden events. However, for the
training to be successful, there is a need to propose scenarios that can startle and surprise
pilots. Presently, few studies have investigated if an unexpected event can startle and/or
surprise pilots by recording vital signs (e.g., respiration rate) and skin conductance
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(Landman et al., 2017a). This study is filling the research gaps by evaluating the effect
of startle and surprise on pilot workload and vital signs (heart rate and respiration rate).
Surprise and startle training can help improve a pilot’s performance during an
emergency (EASA 2014; FAA, 2015). However, pilots cannot be trained for every
possible emergency. For the training to be successful, flight training scenarios must be
proposed that can startle and surprise the pilots. Most studies conducted on the topic only
looked at a single type of aircraft. However, the researcher believes that for commercial
pilots, type of aircraft can be a potential factor that can affect vital signs and
performance.
Research Question and Hypothesis
The researcher for the current study investigated the following research questions.
The study has 10 dependent variables and two independent variables (IV): aircraft with
two levels, single-engine (Cessna 172SP) and multi-engine (Baron 58); and emergency
scenario with three levels, uninformed surprise emergency, uninformed surprise and
startle emergency, and informed emergency.
1. Do significant differences and interactions exist for heart rate (DV) and
respiration rate (DV) based on the aircraft (IV) and emergency scenario (IV)?
2. Do significant differences and interactions exist for mental demand (DV),
physical demand (DV), temporal demand (DV), subjective performance (DV),
effort (DV), and frustration (DV) based on the aircraft (IV) and emergency
scenario (IV)?
3. Do significant differences exist in the flight performance (DV) between the
emergency scenarios (IV) for the multi-engine aircraft as measured by altitude
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deviation?
4. Do significant differences exist in the flight performance (DV) between the
emergency scenarios (IV) for the single-engine aircraft as measured by the
number of engine-failure checklist steps followed?
The following null hypotheses were tested.
H01: There was no significant difference in heart rate between flying a single-engine and
flying a multi-engine aircraft.
H02: There were no significant differences in heart rate among an uninformed surprise
emergency, uninformed surprise and startle emergency, and informed emergency
H03: There were no significant interactions in the heart rate between the aircraft and the
emergency scenario.
H04: There was no significant difference in the respiration rate between flying a singleengine and flying a multi-engine aircraft.
H05: There were no significant differences in respiration rate among an uninformed
surprise emergency, uninformed surprise and startle emergency, and informed
emergency.
H06: There were no significant interactions in the respiration rate between the aircraft and
the emergency scenario.
H07: There was no significant difference in the mental demand between flying a singleengine and multi-engine aircraft.
H08: There were no significant differences in mental demand among an uninformed
surprise emergency, uninformed surprise and startle emergency, and informed
emergency.
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H09: There were no significant interactions in mental demand between the aircraft and
the emergency scenario.
H010: There was no significant difference in physical demand between flying a singleengine and multi-engine aircraft.
H011: There were no significant differences in physical demand between an uninformed
surprise emergency, uninformed surprise and startle emergency, and informed
emergency.
H012: There were no significant interactions in physical demand between the aircraft and
the emergency scenario.
H013: There was no significant difference in temporal demand between flying a singleengine and multi-engine aircraft.
H014: There were no significant differences in temporal demand between an uninformed
surprise emergency, uninformed surprise and startle emergency, and informed emergency
H015: There were no significant interactions in temporal demand between the aircraft and
the emergency scenario.
H016: There was no significant difference in subjective performance between flying a
single-engine and multi-engine aircraft.
H017: There were no significant differences in subjective performance between an
uninformed surprise emergency, uninformed surprise and startle emergency, and
informed emergency
H018: There were no significant interactions in subjective performance between the
aircraft and the emergency scenario.
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H019: There was no significant difference in effort between flying a single-engine and
multi-engine aircraft.
H020: There were no significant differences in effort between an uninformed surprise
emergency, uninformed surprise and startle emergency, and informed emergency.
H021: There were no significant interactions in effort between the aircraft and the
emergency scenario.
H022: There was no significant difference in frustration between flying a single-engine
and multi-engine aircraft.
H023: There were no significant differences in frustration between an uninformed
surprise emergency, uninformed surprise and startle emergency, and informed
emergency.
H024: There were no significant interactions in frustration between the aircraft and the
emergency scenario.
H025: There were no significant differences in flight performance among the emergency
scenarios for the multi-engine aircraft as measured by altitude deviation.
H026: There were no significant differences in flight performance among the emergency
scenarios for the single-engine aircraft as measured by the number of engine-failure
checklist steps followed.
Delimitations
The results of this study should be considered in the context of the following
delimitations:
1. The study only evaluated two scenarios that have the potential to induce
surprise and two scenarios that have the potential to induce startle and
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surprise.
2. The study only observed commercial pilots with single-engine and multiengine rating.
3. The study observed pilots on the X-Plane 11 Basic Aviation Training Device
(BATD) while flying a Cessna 172 six-pack (C172SP) and Beechcraft Baron
58.
4. The study cannot represent the whole pilot population in the aviation industry.
Limitations and Assumptions
The researcher sought to mitigate potential limitations that can change the results.
For this study, the following limitations were considered:
1. The BATD, though realistic in nature, involves simulation limits such as lack
of motion and gravitational forces.
2. The participants were not randomly selected for this study.
3. The participant’s behavior was observed under controlled conditions, which
may not be the same in a natural environment.
The following assumptions were considered for this study:
1. The study assumed that each participant was physically fit and capable of
flying a scenario in a BATD.
2. The participants have never received any training related to startle and
surprise.
3. The study also assumed construct validity in that the surprise and startle
emergency properly reflected (or induced) startle (and same for the surprise).
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Definitions of Terms
Aircraft

A device that is used or intended to be used for flight in the air
(FAA and Aviation Supplies and Academics [ASA], 2015).

Startle

An uncontrollable, automatic muscle reflex, raised heart rate, and
blood pressure elicited by exposure to a sudden, intense event that
violates a pilot’s expectations (FAA, 2015).

Surprise

An unexpected event that violates a pilot’s expectations and can
affect the mental processes used to respond to the event (FAA,
2015).

List of Acronyms
AC

Advisory Circular

AF447

Air France 447

AS

Automation Surprise

ASRS

Aviation Safety Reporting System

BATD

Basic Aviation Training Device

BEA

Bureau of Enquiry and Analysis for Civil Aviation Safety

CA3407

Colgan Air 3407

CAST

Commercial Aviation Safety Team

CRM

Crew Resource Management

DAB

Daytona Beach International Airport

DOT

Department of Transportation

DSB

Dutch Safety Board

ERAU

Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University
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EASA

European Air Safety Agency

FAA

Federal Aviation Administration

HR

Heart Rate

HAI

Human Automation Interaction

IATA

International Air Transport Association

ILS

Instrument Landing System

LOC-I

Loss of Control In-Flight

NASA-TLX

National Aeronautics and Space Administration Task Load Index

NPA

Notice of Proposed Amendment

NPRM

Notice of Proposed Rule Making

NTSB

National Transportation Safety Board

PF

Pilot Flying

PNT

Pilot Not Flying

PARC

Performance-Based Aviation Rulemaking Committee

RR

Respiration Rate

SBT

Scenario-Based Training

SDT

Signal Detection Theory

SPSS

Statistical Package for the Social Sciences

TA1951

Turkish Airlines 1951

UPRT

Upset Prevention and Recovery Training
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Chapter II
Review of the Relevant Literature
A literature review was conducted to identify relevant peer-reviewed articles and
studies. The articles reviewed were related to the supervisory role of humans in
automation, signal detection theory (SDT), automation bias and complacency, startle
effect, surprise, and LOC-I incidents. Further, this study also analyzed the investigation
reports of NTSB, BEA, and the Dutch Safety Board (DSB). Similarly, the Advisory
Circulars (ACs), NPRM, Notice of Proposed Amendment (NPA), and guidance material
related to surprise, and startle was also studied. The review begins by discussing the role
of humans in supervising automation. The literature review then discusses the SDT and
relates it to automation bias and complacency. Further, startle and surprise are discussed
in detail. Lastly, the review relates all the theory to actual airplane accidents in recent
years and discusses pilot training. The purpose of this literature review is to give the
readers a broad overview of the issue at hand and identify potential gaps in the literature
that needs investigation.
Human Supervisory Role in Automation
Casner et al. (2014) suggested that flight automation systems have now assumed
the primary responsibility for many piloting tasks. Pilots are no longer required to carry
out the control inputs manually. This paradigm shift is seeing the pilot's role being
limited to automation monitoring or supervisory (Bhana, 2010). Supervision is defined
as the activity of occasionally programming and receiving information from a computer,
while the performer of the supervision is called a supervisor (Hew, 2016).
Boubin, Rusnock, and Bindewald (2017) ascertained that most automated systems
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cannot replace humans despite having superior performance. Evidently, human operators
can provide value because they can make judgments in situations where automation fails.
To accomplish most tasks safely, human and automation must become a team in which
the human maintains a supervisory role, while the automation makes the majority of the
decisions. However, Bhana (2010) found that instead of teaming up with automation,
pilots normally over-rely on automation during unexpected events. This overreliance
during supervisory duties can lead to improper evaluation of the signals and responses
obtained during an automated process, hence decreasing the performance.
Signal Detection Theory
The processing of information in automated systems begins with the detection of
an environmental event (Wickens, Hollands, Banbury, & Parasuraman, 2013). However,
some stimuli are not identified, or they do not produce the anticipated response (Ponce,
Polasko & Molina, 2016). As a result, the process does not accomplish the desired
results. Hence, SDT is a tool that allows us to evaluate the signals and responses
obtained during a process for increasing the performance of the complete process.
According to Wickens et al. (2013), SDT can be applied to the analysis of the
detection performance by a human alone, by a machine, or by both humans and
machines. The signal detection theory results in two responses: yes (signal is present) or
no (signal not present). For example, there can only be two responses while assessing if
the driving situation is hazardous (Wallis & Horswill, 2007). In this driving situation,
there are two states of the world, and the observer is responsible for deciding which state
has occurred (Wickens et al., 2013).
The combination of the states of the world (i.e., whether a stimulus such as a
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threat is either present or not present) and the operator’s response to the stimulus (i.e.,
whether to treat the stimulus as a threat or not) produces the 2 x 2 matrix shown in Figure
1, generating four classes of joint events (Wickens et al., 2013). The joint events are
labeled as misses, hits, false alarms, and correct rejections (Wallis & Horswill, 2007).

Figure 1. The four outcomes of SDT.

The Commercial Aviation Safety Team (CAST) and the Performance-Based
Aviation Rulemaking Committee (PARC; 2013), suggested that pilots are reluctant to
intervene during emergencies, as they rely too much on automated systems. The SDT
can be applied to pilots, where the identification of the emergency is very important. For
example, in the case of AF447, the aircraft was cruising when the pitot tube was chocked
due to the formation of ice crystals (BEA, 2012). This led to false speed reading, which
resulted in a stall warning (false alarm), the pilot flying (PF) did not recognize the false
alarm. Eventually, severe turbulence, along with stall warning startled the PF who started
pushing the aircraft nose up, further destabilizing the aircraft. However, the pilot not
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flying (PNF) recognized the false alarm but was not aware that the PF did not recognize
the false alarm. The only thing the PF was supposed to do during this situation was just
to fly the aircraft level for a while so that the ice crystals clear away, something he was
trained for; however, his behavior was not consistent with training (BEA, 2012). In the
case of CA3407, the automated system did pitch the aircraft nose down automatically
when the stall was imminent (automation hit), but the PF pulled back on the control,
causing the aircraft to stall and crash (NTSB, 2010).
Automation Compliance and Reliance
In the past two decades, the diverse effects of automation false alarms and misses
on operator trust and performance have been scrupulously examined (e.g., Wickens et al.,
2015; Parasuraman & Riley, 1997). Wickens, Clegg, Vieane, and Sebok (2015)
suggested that imperfect automation in an alerting system can result in two types of
automation errors. If the alerting system misses an actual dangerous event, then it can be
an error of omission. Alternately, if the system issues a false alert, then it can be an error
of commission. Each error will trigger a different Human Automation Interaction (HAI)
behavior when the operator’s anticipation of automation failure is low. The 'overreliance'
of an operator is associated with an error of omission, while the 'over-compliance' is
associated with an error of commission.
According to Dixon, Wickens, and McCarley (2007), automation miss (not aware
of changes made by automation) is more dangerous than an automation false alarm, as it
may lead to true future alerts being disregarded. Automation miss is troublesome if the
operator relies on the automation to identify all events (Wickens et al., 2015).
Alternately, Dixon and Wickens (2006) suggested that an increase in automation miss
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rate reduces reliance, thus, causing the operator to monitor the raw data behind the
automation miss, which diverts the attention of the operator from other concurrent tasks,
causing a deterioration in performance. Congruently, Geels-Blair, Rice, and Schward
(2013) found that automation misses tend to cause a reduction in reliance. Conversely,
automation false alarms tend to cause a reduction in compliance.
According to Wickens et al. (2015), overreliance and over-compliance are closely
associated with HAI problems of complacency and automation bias. Complacency is
linked to the failure to be attentive in supervising automation before an automation miss.
Similarly, Bhana (2010) suggested that in aviation, automation complacency is a term
interchangeable with automation overconfidence and is described as pilots becoming
complacent because they are overconfident and uncritical of automation. Parasuraman
and Riley (1997) ascertained that automation complacency occurs when the operator
excessively trusts the automation and fails to perform his supervisory duty. Lee (2008)
suggests that automation seems to relieve people of tasks, but automation requires more
attention to training and integration design. The BEA (2012) in the official report on
AF447 accident, discovered that the autopilot disconnection made the crew aware that
there was an issue. The crew was not sure why the autopilot disconnected. The autopilot
disconnection led to a false instrument reading, which surprised both pilots and startled
the co-pilot. The surprise and startle event started because the pilots were over-relying
on automation during an emergency to assist with the task. Congruently, Parasuraman
and Riley (1997) found that complacency has been a contributing factor in accidents in
domains other than aviation. A widely cited example is the grounding of the cruise ship
Royal Majesty, where it was found that the overreliance of the watch officers on
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automation systems was a probable cause of the accident. Alternately, Wickens et al.
(2015) suggested that automation bias is the tendency to use automated cues as a
replacement for information seeking. Eventually, this results in an error as the operator
fails to notice a problem simply because the automation fails to detect them.
Similarly, Sauser, Chavaillaz, and Wastell (2016) found that automation bias is a
tendency to follow the advice of the automation without deeming it correct or wrong.
Parasuraman and Manzey (2010) ascertained that even with extended training and
practice, the elimination of complacency and automation bias is difficult to achieve.
Complacency and automation bias are closely linked with the pilots being startled and
surprised during unexpected events (BEA, 2012; DSB, 2010).
Startle
Startle is a response to an unexpected stimulus that is common in all mammals
(Simons, 1996). According to Koch (1999) and Martin et al. (2012), startle is an event
that triggers (a) a spontaneous physiological reflex, and (b) a behavioral startle response.
The spontaneous startle reflex is fast, and it involves eye blinks, contraction of muscles,
head ducks, and shoulder squat up. All these actions are to prepare the body for
protection against unexpected situations. Similarly, the startle response includes
spontaneous muscle contractions like a startle reflex, but also other emotional and
cognitive resources. The startle reflex can trigger through auditory, visual, or tactile
stimuli. It begins within 100 milliseconds (ms) of a stimulus being sensed (Carlsen, Chua,
Inglis, Sanderson, & Franks, 2008; Yeomans, Li, Scott, & Frankland, 2002). Startle
reflex lasts less than one second for a mild response and in the range of 1 s to 1.5 s for a
severe response (Rivera et al., 2014; Ekman, Friesen, & Simons, 1985). Fetcho and
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Mclean (2010) suggested that one way to elicit a startle is by presenting a sudden and
loud sound. For example, a sound level of 80-90 decibels (dB) and more can startle a
person (Fetcho & Mclean, 2018).
Fear-potentiated startle. According to Davis (1992) and Martin et al. (2015),
the effects of startle increase when it occurs in the presence of a threating stimulus. Such
aggregative responses which are worse in magnitude and have a longer-lasting effect are
described as fear-potentiated startle. Similarly, Martin, Murrary, Bates, and Lee (2016)
found that the fear-potentiated startle ensues from the combination of startling stimulus
and the perception of threat, causing a fully developed stress reaction. According to
Gillen (2016) and Rivera et al. (2014), unexpected events on the flight deck, such as
aerodynamic stalls trigger fear-potentiated startle. Research has shown that fearpotentiated startle results in a significant cognitive disruption in most people (Gillen,
2016; Thackray &Touchstone, 1970).
Cognitive consequences due to startle. Gillen (2016) found that the cognitive
resources of humans are finite. The author suggested that pilots need to devote more
cognitive resources when flying manually, due to system failures or other issues. Further,
the study found that during such system failures, most pilots tend to lose the ability to
mentally project where the airplane is in space in regard to altitude, airspeed, and
configuration.
Thackray and Touchstone (1970) determined that the recovery of performance
after a startling event is quick. After the introduction of a startling stimulus, the
maximum disruption occurs for the first 5 s. While significantly less disruption after the
second 5 s interval lasts for 30 s to 1 minute. So, it is evident that the major performance
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decline occurs within the first 5 s following a startle. Similarly, Martin et al. (2012)
found that startle reaction may last between 0.3 s to 1.5 s, depending on the severity.
Thackray and Touchstone (1983) found that the participants who were exposed to a
sudden high potency aural alarm signal made more incorrect responses on a task. On the
other hand, participants who received a low-intensity alarm signal made less incorrect
responses. Startle disrupts cognitive processing and negatively influences an individual's
decision making and problem-solving abilities.
Gillen (2016), discussing the multiple resource theory, suggested that task
performance depends on the relation between two parameters: cognitive resources
available and the complexity of the situation. Ippel (1987; as cited in Gillen, 2016)
suggested that task performance can be satisfactory if the amount of resources consumed
by the task is lower than or equal to the available amount of memory. Alternatively, task
performance can decline if the amount of resources consumed is greater than the
available memory. Similarly, Martin et al. (2012) found that the performance of pilots
during a startling event declined when the cognitive loads exceeded the number of
available resources.
Startle from the aviation perspective. Gillen (2016) found that startle has been
well researched and documented over the past 60 years. The concept of startle was
introduced in the aviation industry after the accidents of CA3407, AF447, and TA1951.
Since these accidents, few studies have been conducted related to startle among pilots
(Gillen, 2016; Landman et al., 2017a; Landman, Groen, van Paassen, Bronkhorst, &
Mulder, 2017b; Martin, Murray, & Bates, 2012; Martin et al., 2015; Martin et al., 2016;
Rivera et al., 2014). According to IATA (2015a), startle is defined as the initial short-
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lived, spontaneous physiological and cognitive reactions to an unexpected event that
initiate the normal human stress response. Similarly, as stated earlier, according to FAA
(2015), startle is defined as an uncontrollable muscle reflex, and high blood pressure due
to sudden exposure to an intense event.
Martin et al. (2015) suggested that airline pilots are regularly vulnerable to
startling stimuli. However, most of these stimuli are irrelevant, but some pilots are
exposed to critical events. For example, in the case of AF447, the aircraft was flying
through severe turbulence and had a blocked pitot tube, which was startling for the PF,
though this type of situation is common when flying over the Atlantic and some pilots
will not find it startling or surprising. Similarly, Rivera et al. (2014) suggested that pilots
can experience a variety of stimuli on the flight deck that can trigger a startle reflex and
response. However, the main concern during or after a startle is the appropriateness of
the pilot’s decision choice and execution. The BEA (2012) in the accident report of
AF447 found that the PF was so much startled that he verbally agreed to the PNF pitch
down instruction, while still actually pitching up. Hence the need for an appropriate
decision about complex flight tasks during startle is of utmost importance.
The BEA (2012), in the investigative report of AF447, found that the poor
management of the startle effect was one of the causes of the accident. Further, it was
found that the startle effect played a significant role in the destabilization of the flight
path. Interestingly it was found that the crew had performed training like the actual
operating scenario, but the training did not consider the ramification of startle on their
behavior. Similarly, the NTSB (2012), in the accident report of CA3407, found that the
captain’s behavior was consistent with startle and confusion. The PF, in the case of
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CA3407, reacted similarly to the PF in the case of AF447, where he pulled back on the
control after stall when he should have pulled down.
Gillen (2016) substantiated that training related to the startle effect can improve
pilot performance. The study considered a total of 40 crews (80 individual pilots). The
participants were briefed that they will fly a profile in the simulator. Twenty flight crews
(40 individual pilots) received training on how to deal with a startle. The training session
included briefing and simulator practice. During simulator flight, the events that led to
the pilot’s being surprised, Gillen considered them as startle events. It appears that there
was discord over the definition of the terms surprise and startle. As stated earlier, startle
and surprise have different responses and they cannot be used in the same terminology.
The study only considered two scenarios; however, there are ample scenarios to research.
Physiological measurements for startle. As stated earlier, startle is associated
with high heart rate and blood pressure (FAA, 2015). To date, no study has performed
physiological measurements for pilots during a startling event. Landman et al. (2017a)
ascertained that different factors need to be manipulated to induce a startle or surprise. A
loud explosion or an abrupt sound can induce a startle. When compared to a surprising
event, a startling event more likely will lead to higher blood pressure and heart rate. A
startling event may also impact the respiration rate of pilots; however, there has been no
study done to investigate those effects.
Surprise
The definition of surprise varies and depends on the context it is being used. The
basic definition of surprise as postulated by Bredehoeft (2005), is the gathering of new
information that voids the original conceptual model. Similarly, surprise is also defined
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as a cognitive-emotional response to something unanticipated, which leads to a conflict
between one’s expectation and awareness of one’s environment (Horstmann, 2006;
Schützwohl, 1998). Rivera et al. (2014) suggested that the main concern with surprise is
that it can interrupt an ongoing task. For example, Horstmann (2006) found that a
surprising occurrence (unannounced visual event) hampered the continuous action of
78% of the participants who were doing rapid alternate finger tapping. In that study, the
average duration of the interruption lasted about 1 s.
Surprise in aviation perspective. According to IATA (2015a), surprise is
defined as the emotionally based acceptance of a difference in what is actual and what
was expected. Similarly, as stated earlier, according to the FAA (2015), surprise is
defined as an unexpected event that can influence the mental process of a pilot to respond
to an emergency. Congruently, Hilscher, Breiter, and Kochan (2012) found that flight
crew (pilots) can be surprised due to an unexpected event during the flight that
contradicts their expectations. Casner et al. (2013) ascertained that pilots have
considerable difficulties with applying learned procedures when they are surprised.
Casner et al. showed that the time to respond to an event increases when this event comes
abruptly. The results of the study suggested pilots to stop testing and practicing
unexpected events, in the same way, every time because it becomes excepted and
predictable.
Automation surprise. Present-day cockpit automation consists of auto-throttle,
autopilot, flight management system, flight director, and multiple other systems
(Moriarty, 2014). These systems link together to ensure partially or fully automated
flight when required. Kochan et al. (2004) identified automation as one of the major
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culprits in triggering flight deck surprises.
According to Woods and Sarter (2002; as cited in de Boer and Hurts, 2017), three
factors increase the probability of automation surprise: (a) acts by the automation without
immediately preceding crew input, (b) gaps in the pilot’s mental representation on
automation, and (c) sub-standard feedback of the automation. Similarly, Dekker (2014)
found that automation surprise is the outcome of an anomaly between one’s expectation
and the actual system behavior. This anomaly is only discovered when the crew notices
an unexpected behavior on their part, which may already have led to serious
consequences by that time.
De Boer and Hurts (2017) suggested that automation has increased in complexity,
which has given rise to concerns. The behavior of pilots when dealing with automation is
unexplained in approximately 46% of the aircraft accident reports and 60% of major
aircraft incident reports (PARC/CAST, 2013). Congruently, EASA (2013) suggested that
unanticipated events are one of the leading issues in-flight crew automation that requires
attention. The Dutch Safety Board (DSB) (2010), in the accident report of TA1951,
found that the crew was completely taken by surprise because they were over-relying on
the automation, which had failed their expectations. The aircraft had a faulty altimeter
that went unnoticed and led to a low altitude stall which crashed the aircraft. De Boer
and Hurts (2017) found that without AS, the mismatch between reality and the pilot's
expectation continues until reality readjusts with the expectation without them ever
knowing.
Physiological measurements for surprise. Landman et al. (2017b) and Bruna,
Levora, and Holub (2018) recorded physiological measurements while pilots were flying
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a surprise scenario in a flight simulator. Landman et al. (2017b) did not find a significant
difference in heart rate between a surprise and a normal condition. However, they did
find a significant difference in the skin conductance between the conditions. Bruna et al.
(2018) found a significant difference in the respiration rate between different phases of
flight when flying with and without navigation. The study also expected to see
differences in the heart rate between the conditions, but those results are reported to
another paper that is yet to be published.
Loss of Control In-Flight
According to IATA (2015b), LOC-I is defined as the loss of an aircraft while it is
in flight. This also includes aerodynamics stalls and upsets following an aircraft system
failure. Gillen (2016) suggested that people often inaccurately associate landing and
takeoff stage as the area with the highest risks. Boeing (2019) found that LOC-I is the
single largest category of fatalities from 2009 through 2018, accounting for 1181
fatalities from 13 accidents.
According to Gillen (2016), most of the LOC-I accidents were the outcome of an
unexpected event at the beginning of the accident timeline. LOC-I can begin suddenly
following an inappropriate decision by the pilots. Similarly, Landman et al. (2017b)
suggested that several of these events have been associated with inappropriate responses
of the flight crew, and it is commonly suspected that surprise and startle contribute to
such inappropriate responses (NTSB, 2010; BEA, 2012; DSB, 2010). Landman et al.
(2017a) found that several recent flight safety events involving LOC-I, the
unexpectedness of the situation is thought to have induced startle complicating the crew’s
troubleshooting (Martin et al., 2016).
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Training and Unanticipated Events
The accident reports of AF447, CA3407, and TA1951 ascertain that the repose of
pilots to an unanticipated event was different from the way they were trained. A study
conducted by Martin et al. (2014) found pilots that did not receive startle and surprise
training performed inappropriately or ineffectively. Alternately, pilots that received
startle and surprise training performed effectively. Similarly, Casner et al. (2012)
ascertained that there were considerable delays in the responses of pilots following an
unexpected event. Congruently, Gillen (2016) found that pilots receiving startle training
performed better during unexpected scenarios than pilots not receiving any training.
Gillen (2016) suggested that the training of airline pilots has become predictable
in the current regulatory environment. Presently, the training will transfer well to
predictable situations like the tests and most likely will not help during an actual
emergency (Landman, van Oorschot, van Paassen, Groen, Bronkhorst, & Mulder, 2018).
However, the FAA (2013) suggested different training scenarios with the emphasis on
different areas, including startle and surprise. The design of the training scenarios is to
provide the crew with a startle experience, which allows for the effective recovery of the
airplane during an emergency. Similarly, the FAA (2017) also suggested training
scenarios with the emphasis on startle and surprise.
Further, it was suggested that the flight instructors should plan upset scenarios
that are likely to result in a startle or surprise. Finally, for the training to be beneficial, it
should cover unexpected events over a wide array of circumstances and operations
parameters (Casner et al., 2012). Presently there is no mandatory training for startle and
surprise. However, Landman et al. (2018) hope that training will become mandatory in
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the near future. A potential gap in the literature is that few studies have proposed flight
simulator scenarios that can startle and surprise pilots.
Workload Measurement using NASA-TLX
The NASA-TLX is a widely used tool to measure workload. The NASA-TLX
has six subjective scales that are represented on a single page and include: (a) mental
demand, (b) physical demand, (c) temporal demand, (d) performance, (e) effort, and
(f) frustration (NASA, 1986). Workload measured using NASA-TLX is self-evaluated
and is limited to the perception of the participant regarding the task (Fernandes &
Braarud, 2015). The complexity and environment of a task can influence the workload.
Therefore, during startle and surprise emergencies, it is fair to expect the workload score
to go up when compared to an informed emergency. To date, no study has evaluated the
workload of the pilot during emergencies that can be startling and surprising. However,
Suppiah (2019) evaluated the workload using NASA-TLX during unexpected scenarios
where the pilots were using electronic and then paper charts. The unexpected scenarios
in this study might be surprising; however, they were not considered as a surprise
emergency.
Summary
This literature review intended to provide the readers with an extensive
background on which to base the study. The literature discussed the role of humans as
supervisors of automation. It is known that humans over-rely on automated systems,
which is the basis for automation bias. Similarly, automation tends to miss information
or issue false alarms. The processing of information in automated systems was discussed
in detail with the help of SDT.
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Further, the literature also discussed surprise and startle and related it to the
aviation industry. The consequences of startle and automation surprise on the pilot's
performance were then discussed while relating it to some recent LOC-I incidents. The
focus of the literature review was on the lack of training that airline pilots received and
how proposing realistic scenarios can help with startle and surprise training. Potential
gaps found during the literature review included the lack of studies that proposed flight
simulator scenarios that can startle and surprise pilots. Also, few studies did measure
vital signs such as HR and RR but only during surprise events. Among the few studies,
the focus of all was on commercial airline pilots. Though airline pilots are important, if
the training scenarios are practiced while pilots finish their training before flying for
commercial airlines, it can ensure pilots are proficient in multiple potential scenarios that
can be startling and surprising. Lastly, no study assessed the pilot workload during startle
and surprise events.
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Chapter III
Methodology
The methodology presented in this chapter supports the procedures used to
investigate scenarios that can induce startle and surprise in pilots. In the current study,
participants were asked to fly six scenarios in a BATD during which their HR and RR
were recorded. After each flight, participants completed the NASA-TLX and an openended question, see Appendix C. Before data collection, permission to conduct the
research was applied to the Institutional Review Board at ERAU, which was granted.
The IRB approval and informed consent form are shown in Appendices A and B,
respectively. This chapter provided the readers with an overview of the methods used.
Population/Sample
Forty (36 males and 4 females) commercial pilots with single-engine and multiengine ratings participated in this study. The participants were selected using
convenience sampling from a pool of commercial pilots at Embry-Riddle Aeronautical
University (ERAU). Participants were recruited using email announcements and paper
flyers. Each participant who completed the study was paid $20.
Apparatus and materials. Six flight scenarios were created on an Elite PI-135
BATD using X-Plane 11 software. The health vitals HR and RR were recorded using the
Nexus 10 device (MindMedia Inc., NL) that sampled at 1024 Hz and transmitted data to
the data-acquisition computer via a cable. This study used the Statistical Package for the
Social Sciences (SPSS) for statistical analysis of the data.
Design and procedures. This study was an experimental within-subject design.
There were two independent variables (aircraft and emergency scenario) and eight

29
dependent variables. The aircraft variable had two levels and the emergency scenario
variable had three levels making it a 2 x 3 within-subjects design. The IVs and DVs are
shown in Figure 1. The purpose of the study was not disclosed to the participants, who
were informed that they would fly an Instrument Landing System (ILS) approach at
Daytona Beach International Airport (DAB). When the study concluded, each participant
was debriefed about the purpose of the study.

Figure 2. The independent and dependent variables for this study.

In the BATD, each participant flew six flight scenarios, where three configured as
a C172SP and three configured as a Beechcraft Baron 58. Twenty participants flew three
flights configured as a Baron aircraft followed by three flights in the Cessna; the other
half flew Cessna, followed by the Baron. To induce startle, the researcher introduced
loud bang and thunder sound during the simulation, where 20 participants heard a loud
bang in the Baron and thunder noise in the Cessna, while the other half heard thunder
sound in Baron and loud bang in Cessna. The sounds were played from a distance of
0.89 meters using a speaker that lasted 1 to 2 s, and a sound meter was used to measure
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the sounds in dB. The thunder sound was 85-89 dB, while the loud bang sound was 8791 dB. Due to the unfamiliarity of most participants with the Baron, the researcher had
them all fly a practice flight. The practice flight was a 3 nautical mile (nm) visual
approach to 25R DAB. The researcher asked the pilots to maneuver the aircraft, increase
and decrease speed using the throttle, climb and descent, and eventually land the aircraft.
After each flight, the researcher had the participant complete the NASA-TLX and
an open-ended question. The NASA-TLX has six subjective scales which are rated on a
scale of 1-20. A score of 1 is equivalent to the lowest possible workload, while a score of
20 is equivalent to the highest possible workload. An open-ended question “Which
options best describes your perception of the task? (Check all that apply)” was used as a
manipulation check where all participants were asked their perception about the three
emergency scenarios for both aircraft, participants were asked if they found the
emergency surprising, startling, both, or neither. The performance of the participants
while flying was logged by the X-Plane software and evaluated differently for each
aircraft. The description of the flight simulator scenarios for each aircraft is shown in
Tables 1 and 2. The reason for having engine failure for Cessna at 1500 feet was to give
the participant’s time to initiate the checklist. For the multi-engine aircraft the engine
failure was at 450 feet because the researcher had set up conditions for a missed approach
(decision altitude = 234 feet) and having an engine failure at a high altitude would have
resulted in some participants just flying the aircraft level to troubleshoot the problem,
while some participants could have just aborted the landing. For the purpose of this
study, the decision altitude used to evaluate the performance was changed to 180 feet as
the participants were flying six-pack configuration.
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Table 1
Description of BATD Emergency Scenarios for Baron 58
Scenario
Uninformed Surprise
Emergency

Scenario Parameters
3 nm ILS approach to
25R DAB

Uninformed Surprise and
Startle Emergency

3 nm ILS approach to
25R DAB

Informed Emergency

3 nm ILS approach to
25R DAB

Scenario Description
Engine failure at 450 feet
with runway not visible at
minimum
Engine failure at 450 feet
with runway not visible at
minimum. A loud bang or
thunder sound at different
altitudes
Engine failure at 450 feet
with runway not visible at
minimum, go missed

Note. 20 participants heard the loud bang while 20 participants heard the thunder sound
(with lightning simulated by turning the light on and off multiple times) in
Baron uninformed surprise and startle emergency scenario.
Startle stimulus was introduced at 600, 500, 450, 400, 300 feet.

Table 2
Description of Flight BATD Emergency Scenarios for C172SP
Scenario
Uninformed Surprise
Emergency

Scenario Parameters
10 nm ILS approach to
25R DAB

Uninformed Surprise and
Startle Emergency

10 nm ILS approach to
25R DAB

Informed Emergency

10 nm ILS approach to
25R DAB

Scenario Description
Engine failure at 1500 feet
with cloud layer set at
1000 feet
Engine failure at 1500 feet
and engine fire at 1000
feet. A loud bang or
thunder sound at different
altitudes
Engine failure at 1500 feet
with a cloud layer set at
1000 feet

Note. 20 participants heard the loud bang while 20 participants heard the thunder sound
(with lightning simulated by turning the light on and off multiple times) in
Cessna uninformed surprise and startle emergency scenario.
Startle stimulus was introduced at 1700, 1500, 1400, 1300, 1000 feet.
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Sources of the Data
The HR and RR were measured at 32 samples per second using Nexus 10, which
has been used in multiple published research studies. The performance of the participants
for Cessna was measured by the number of checklist steps following an engine failure.
The performance for Baron was measured in terms of deviation after crossing the
decision altitude of 180 feet. Participants with an altitude of 180 or more deviated 0 feet
from the decision altitude. The altitude was recorded by X-Plane software at five
samples per second, which the researcher extracted after each flight. The workload and
open-ended questions for each scenario were collected using a paper copy of the NASATLX.
Instrument reliability. The Elite-PI 135 BATD was successfully used in
multiple published studies (Dattel et al., 2019; Suppiah, 2019) and is an FAA approved
BATD. A pilot study was done using the BATD with a subject matter expert (SME)
acting as the participant, who was satisfied with the functionality of the BATD and found
the scenario parameters realistic. The SME was a full-time flight instructor with the
ERAU flight department.
Bruna et al. (2018) measured the reparation rate of pilots while flying an
emergency scenario using Nexus 10. Nexus 10 is being widely used in clinical research,
and numerous studies have been conducted using this device (Bruna et al., 2018;
Schuman & Killian, 2019).
Instrument validity. The NASA-TLX, Nexus 10, and the Elite-PI BATD are all
valid instruments that are being used in different studies (Bruna et al., 2018; Dattel et al.,
2019, & Suppiah, 2019). However, to ensure that all these devices were measuring what
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the researcher intended them to measure, the researcher manipulated both IVs. The order
was counterbalanced by having half participants fly the Cessna followed by the Baron,
and having the other half fly the Baron followed by the Cessna. For each aircraft, the
first flight was an uninformed surprise emergency, the second flight was an uninformed
startle and surprise emergency, and the third flight was informed emergency.
It was not possible to fully counterbalance the order of the emergency as that
would have disclosed the emergency to the participant. However, the order of the two
noise conditions was counterbalanced to counter an order effect due to the noise type
where half the participants flying Cessna heard a loud bang while the other half heard
thunder (lightning simulated by turning the light on and off). Conversely, half the
participants flying the startle and surprise uninformed emergency in the Baron heard a
loud bang while the other half heard thunder (lightning simulated by turning the light on
and off).
Treatment of the Data
The HR and RR were recorded for all six flights using Nexus 10, and the output
was saved as an Excel file where the researcher calculated the mean HR (beats per
minute) and RR (breaths per minute), which the researcher entered in the main Excel data
file. In the main data file, the researcher then entered the NASA-TLX self-assessed
scores and the answer to the open-ended question for all six flights, asking participants
about their perception task. The NASA-TLX scores were on a scale of 1 to 20, while the
open-ended question had four possible answers (surprising, startling, both, or neither).
The number of checklist steps followed after engine failure for the Cessna aircraft was
reported on paper by the researcher and then entered in the main data file for each
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participant. For the Baron aircraft, the altitude at which the missed approach was
initiated was entered, which the researcher extracted from X-plane software. X- Plane
recorded the altitude in a text file that the researcher had to open, then visually see the
altitude and enter it in the main data file for each participant. The data in the excel file
was then open using the SPSS where the researcher then evaluated the data. All the data
was rounded to 2 decimal places for consistency.
Descriptive statistics. The study presented the means and standard deviation for
the HR, RR, and workload factors. Participant demographic and their answer to the
open-ended question were also presented using pictorial representation.
Hypothesis testing. For the purpose of this research, the researcher evaluated
each of the following 26 null hypotheses using a 2 x 3 with-subjects ANOVA. Post hoc
tests were run for all significant interactions and significant main effect for emergency.
H01: There was no significant difference in heart rate between flying a single-engine and
flying a multi-engine aircraft.
H02: There were no significant differences in heart rate among an uninformed surprise
emergency, uninformed surprise and startle emergency, and informed emergency
H03: There were no significant interactions in heart rate between the aircraft and the
emergency scenario.
H04: There was no significant difference in respiration rate between flying a singleengine and flying a multi-engine aircraft.
H05: There were no significant differences in respiration rate among an uninformed
surprise emergency, uninformed surprise and startle emergency, and informed emergency
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H06: There were no significant interactions in respiration rate between the aircraft and the
emergency scenario.
H07: There was no significant difference in mental demand between flying a singleengine and multi-engine aircraft.
H08: There were no significant differences in mental demand among an uninformed
surprise emergency, uninformed surprise and startle emergency, and informed emergency
H09: There were no significant interactions in mental demand between the aircraft and
the emergency scenario.
H010: There was no significant difference in physical demand between flying a singleengine and multi-engine aircraft.
H011: There were no significant differences in physical demand between an uninformed
surprise emergency, uninformed surprise and startle emergency, and informed emergency
H012: There were no significant interactions in physical demand between the aircraft and
the emergency scenario.
H013: There was no significant difference in temporal demand between flying a singleengine and multi-engine aircraft.
H014: There were no significant differences in temporal demand between an uninformed
surprise emergency, uninformed surprise and startle emergency, and informed emergency
H015: There were no significant interactions in temporal demand between the aircraft and
the emergency scenario.
H016: There was no significant difference in subjective performance between flying a
single-engine and multi-engine aircraft.
H017: There were no significant differences in subjective performance between an
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uninformed surprise emergency, uninformed surprise and startle emergency, and
informed emergency
H018: There were no significant interactions in subjective performance between the
aircraft and the emergency scenario.
H019: There was no significant difference in effort between flying a single-engine and
multi-engine aircraft.
H020: There were no significant differences in effort between an uninformed surprise
emergency, uninformed surprise and startle emergency, and informed emergency
H021: There were no significant interactions in effort between the aircraft and the
emergency scenario.
H022: There was no significant difference in frustration between flying a single-engine
and multi-engine aircraft.
H023: There were no significant differences in frustration between an uninformed
surprise emergency, uninformed surprise and startle emergency, and informed emergency
H024: There were no significant interactions in frustration between the aircraft and the
emergency scenario.
One-way repeated-measures ANOVAs were run to test the following null
hypotheses. A Bonferroni post hoc was run if the ANOVA was significant.
H025: There were no significant differences in flight performance among the emergency
scenarios for the multi-engine aircraft as measured by altitude deviation.
H026: There were no significant differences in flight performance among the emergency
scenarios for the single-engine aircraft as measured by the number of engine-failure
checklist steps followed.
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Qualitative analysis. Participants (N = 25) that had the startle reflex or seemed
surprised were asked if they wish to provide their narrative of the flight simulator
scenarios and answer questions asked by the researcher. The researcher visually
observed startle reflex which was associated with fast eye blinks, head ducks, or shoulder
squat up. While surprise was associated with small gasps, sudden onset of anger, or a
verbalization of what was being felt.
The questions were specific to the pilot’s behavior while flying. For example,
most participants were asked the reason for not initiating a go-around at the decision
altitude for the multi-engine aircraft. Similarly, participants were asked the reason for
not turning the fuel selector off during engine fire for the single-engine aircraft. Lastly,
most participants were also asked why their performance was the best while flying the
informed emergency condition. The researcher used the narrative of the pilots to
interpret the results of the study.
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Chapter IV
Results
This chapter presents the results for this study, which include descriptive and
inferential statistics. Based on the results of null hypothesis testing, decisions to either
retain or reject the null hypothesis were made (using a criteria of α = .05). The
assumptions for each statistical test were tested, and if any assumption were violated,
appropriate measures were taken.
Descriptive Statistics
Forty participants (male: n = 36, female: n = 4) participated in this study. All
participants were asked about their perception of the emergency. For all three
emergencies for both aircraft, participants were asked if they found the emergency
surprising, startling, both, or neither. The results for participant perception are presented
in Table 3.

Table 3
Participant Perception of Emergency Scenario Based on Aircraft
Variable

Multi-Engine

Single-Engine

Surprising Startling Both Neither Surprising

Startling

Both

Neither

Uninformed
Surprise

22

5

9

4

26

2

5

7

Uninformed
Surprise and
Startle

8

9

20

3

10

8

20

2

Informed

6

4

2

28

3

4

3

30

Note. N = 40.
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Non-parametric Statistics for Manipulation Check
For each scenario, a chi-square goodness of fit test was run as a manipulation
check. Distributions of the four possible responses from the participant perception
question about the scenario are shown in Table 3.
Uninformed surprise emergency for multi-engine aircraft. A chi-square
goodness of fit was run to test the null hypothesis that participant perception for
uninformed surprise emergency for multi-engine aircraft occurred with equal
probabilities. The test showed a significant discrepancy in the distributions of observed
and expected frequencies, χ2(3, N = 40) = 20.60, p < .001. The scenario was surprising
for 55% of the participants, while the second common response was surprising and
startling (both), which accounted for 22.5% of the participants.
Uninformed surprise and startle emergency for multi-engine aircraft. A chisquare goodness of fit was run to test the null hypothesis that participant perception for
uninformed surprise and startle emergency for multi-engine aircraft occurred with equal
probabilities. The test showed a significant discrepancy in the distributions of observed
and expected frequencies, χ2(3, N = 40) = 15.40, p = .002. The scenario was surprising
and startling (both) for 50% of the participants, while the second common response was
startling, which accounted for 22.5% of the participants.
Informed emergency for multi-engine aircraft. A chi-square goodness of fit
was run to test the null hypothesis that participant perception for informed emergency for
multi-engine aircraft occurred with equal probabilities. The test showed a significant
discrepancy in the distributions of observed and expected frequencies,
χ2(3, N = 40) = 44.00, p < .001. The scenario was neither surprising nor startling
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(neither) for 70% of the participants, while the second common response was surprising
which accounted for 15% of the participants.
Uninformed surprise emergency for single-engine aircraft. A chi-square
goodness of fit was run to test the null hypothesis that participant perception for
uninformed surprise emergency for single-engine aircraft occurred with equal
probabilities. The test showed a significant discrepancy in the distributions of observed
and expected frequencies, χ2(3, N = 40) = 35.40, p < .001. The scenario was surprising
for 65% of the participants, while the second common response was neither surprising
nor startling (neither), which accounted for 17.5% of the participants.
Uninformed surprise and startle emergency for single-engine aircraft. A chisquare goodness of fit was run to test the null hypothesis that participant perception for
uninformed surprise and startle emergency for multi-engine aircraft occurred with equal
probabilities. The test showed a significant discrepancy in the distributions of observed
and expected frequencies, χ2(3, N = 40) = 16.80, p = .001. The scenario was surprising
and startling (both) for 50% of the participants, while the second common response was
surprising which accounted for 25% of the participants.
Informed emergency for single-engine aircraft. A chi-square goodness of fit
was run to test the null hypothesis that participant perception for informed emergency for
single-engine aircraft occurred with equal probabilities. The test showed a significant
discrepancy in the distributions of observed and expected frequencies,
χ2(3, N = 40) = 53.40, p < .001. The scenario was neither surprising nor surprising
(neither) for 75% of the participants, while the second common response was startling
which accounted for 10% of the participants.
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Since all six chi-square goodness of fit tests were significant, all the null
hypotheses were rejected (p < .05); there were significant differences among the
distributions of perception responses (surprise, startle, both, and neither) in different
aircraft and emergency scenario conditions.
Inferential Statistics
Heart rate and respiration rate. Separate 2 x 3 with-subjects ANOVAs were
run to assess the effects of aircraft and emergency on HR and RR. The descriptive and
inferential statistics are presented in Table 4 and Table 5.

Table 4
Descriptive Statistics for HR and RR for Emergency Condition and Aircraft
Multi-engine

Single-engine

M

SD

M

SD

Uninformed Surprise

82.33

9.94

79.59

8.27

Uninformed Surprise
and Startle

86.19

9.49

81.91

8.08

Informed

79.54

8.42

77.63

7.54

Total

82.69

8.78

79.71

7.43

Uninformed Surprise

22.36

3.09

20.90

2.72

Uninformed Surprise
and Startle

23.72

3.18

21.44

2.83

Informed

20.80

2.84

19.90

2.63

Total

22.30

2.69

20.75

2.50

Heart Rate

Respiration Rate

Note. N = 40. M = mean; SD = standard deviation.
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Table 5
Two-Way ANOVA Statistics for HR and RR
Dependent
Variable

ANOVA
Effect

MSE

F

df

p-value

ηp2

A*

532.82

9.03

1, 39

.005

0.191

B**

736.61

33.35a

1.63, 63.61

< .001

0.461

A x B*

28.95

3.36

2, 78

.040

0.082

A**

143.38

22.95

1, 39

< .001

0.371

B**

137.57

34.64a

1.45, 56.68

< .001

0.471

A x B*

9.72

5.16

2, 78

.008

0.122

Heart Rate

Respiration Rate

Note. N = 40. A = aircraft; B = emergency; MSE = mean squared error; df = degrees of
freedom; ANOVA = analysis of variance; ηp2= partial eta square.
*p < .05. **p < .01. a Assumption of sphericity violated, thus an adjustment to df was
made using Greenhouse Geisser. 1 large effect. 2 medium effect.

Heart rate post hoc results for main effect of emergency. Using the Bonferroni
post hoc, the mean heart rate of uninformed surprise emergency (M = 80.96, SD = 8.46)
was significantly lower than the mean heart rate of uninformed surprise and startle
emergency (M = 84.05, SD = 8.09, p < .001). The mean heart rate of informed
emergency (M = 78.59, SD = 7.06) was significantly lower than the mean heart rate of
uninformed surprise emergency (p = .002) and the mean heart rate of uninformed surprise
and startle emergency (p < .001). See Figure 3.
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Figure 3. Mean heart rate with error bars (standard error of the mean) based on
emergency.

Heart rate post hoc results for interaction (aircraft*emergency). Using a paired
sample t-test (testwise α = .017, Bonferroni adjustment), the mean heart rate of the
uninformed surprise emergency for multi-engine aircraft was significantly higher than the
mean heart rate of the uninformed surprise emergency for single-engine aircraft (p =
.016). Similarly, the mean heart rate of the uninformed surprise and startle emergency
for multi-engine aircraft was significantly higher than the mean heart rate of the
uninformed emergency for single-engine aircraft (p < .001). However, no significant
difference in mean heart rate in the informed emergency condition was found between
the single- and multi-engine aircraft (p > .016). See Figure 4.
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Figure 4. Mean heart rate for multi-engine and single-engine aircraft based on
emergency.

Respiration rate post hoc results for main effect of emergency. Using the
Bonferroni post hoc, the mean respiration rate of uninformed surprise emergency (M =
21.63, SD = 2.62) was significantly lower than the mean respiration rate of uninformed
surprise and startle emergency (M = 22.58, SD = 2.76, p = .001). The mean respiration
rate of informed emergency (M = 20.40, SD = 2.54) was significantly lower than the
respiration rate of uninformed surprise emergency (p < .001) and the mean respiration
rate of uninformed surprise and startle emergency (p < .001). No other significant
differences were found (p > .05). See Figure 5.

45

23.5
23
22.5

Respiration Rate
(Breaths per minute)

22
21.5
21
20.5
20
19.5
19
18.5
18
Uninformed Surprise

Uninformed Surprise and
Startle

Informed

Figure 5. Mean respiration rate with error bars (standard error of the mean) based on
emergency.

Respiration rate post hoc results for interaction (aircraft*emergency). Using a
paired sample t-test (testwise α = .016, Bonferroni adjustment), the mean respiration rate
of the uninformed surprise emergency for multi-engine aircraft was significantly higher
than the mean respiration rate of the uninformed surprise emergency for single-engine
aircraft (p = .001). Similarly, the mean respiration rate of the uninformed surprise and
startle emergency for multi-engine aircraft was significantly higher than the mean
respiration rate of the uninformed emergency for single-engine aircraft (p < .001).
However, no significant difference in mean respiration rate was found in the informed
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emergency condition between the single- and multi-engine aircraft (p > .016). These
results are depicted in Figure 6.

Figure 6. Mean respiration rate for multi-engine and single-engine aircraft based on
emergency.

Mental, physical, and temporal demand (subjective). Three separate 2 x 3
repeated-measures ANOVAs were run to assess the effects of aircraft and emergency on
the following dependent variables; (a) mental demand, (b) physical demand, and (c)
temporal demand. The descriptive and inferential statistics are presented in Table 6 and 7
respectively.
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Table 6
Descriptive Statistics for Mental, Physical, and Temporal Demand for Emergency
Condition and Aircraft
Multi-engine

Single-engine

M

SD

M

SD

Uninformed Surprise

13.27

4.69

11.08

4.50

Uninformed Surprise
and Startle

14.72

4.50

13.85

4.57

Informed

11.15

4.63

8.30

4.64

Total

13.05

4.17

11.07

4.02

Uninformed Surprise

9.33

4.42

8.05

4.81

Uninformed Surprise
and Startle

12.53

4.96

9.80

4.65

Informed Emergency

10.05

5.05

7.05

4.72

Total

10.63

4.46

8.30

4.43

Uninformed Surprise

13.58

4.73

8.22

5.07

Uninformed Surprise
and Startle

13.43

5.12

12.83

4.68

Informed

10.45

5.07

7.90

4.78

Total

12.48

4.27

9.65

4.04

Mental Demand

Physical Demand

Temporal Demand

Note. N = 40. M = mean; SD = standard deviation.

48
Table 7
Two-Way ANOVA Statistics for Mental Demand, Physical Demand, and Temporal
Demand
Dependent
Variable

ANOVA
Effect

MSE

F

df

p-value

ηp2

A**

234.04

12.58

1, 39

.001

0.241

B**

417.09

64.87

2, 78

< .001

0.621

A x B*

20.26

3.22

2, 78

.045

0.082

A**

326.68

25.93

1, 39

< .001

0.401

B**

172.93

38.63

2, 78

< .001

0.501

A x B*

17.18

3.69

2, 78

.029

0.092

A**

481.67

17.31

1, 39

< .001

0.311

B**

313.72

37.79

2, 78

< .001

0.491

A x B**

114.02

9.32

2, 78

< .001

0.191

Mental Demand

Physical Demand

Temporal Demand

Note. N = 40. A = aircraft; B = emergency; MSE = mean squared error; df = degrees of
freedom; ANOVA = analysis of variance; ηp2= partial eta square.
*p < .05. **p < .01. 1 large effect. 2 medium effect.
Mental demand post hoc results for main effect of emergency. Using the
Bonferroni post hoc, the mean mental demand of uninformed surprise emergency (M =
12.17, SD = 4.06) was significantly lower than the mean mental demand of uninformed
surprise and startle emergency (M = 14.29, SD = 4.09, p < .001). The mean mental
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demand of informed emergency (M = 9.72, SD = 3.78) was significantly lower than the
mean mental demand of uninformed surprise emergency (p < .001) and the mean mental
demand of uninformed surprise and startle emergency (p < .001). See Figure 7.
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Figure 7. Mean mental demand with error bars (standard error of the mean) based on
emergency.

Mental demand post hoc results for interaction (aircraft*emergency). Using a
paired sample t-test (testwise α = .016, Bonferroni adjustment), the mean mental demand
of the uninformed surprise emergency for multi-engine aircraft was significantly higher
than the mean mental demand of the uninformed surprise emergency for single-engine
aircraft (p = .003). Similarly, the mean mental demand of the informed emergency for
multi-engine aircraft was significantly higher than the mean mental demand of the
informed emergency for single-engine aircraft (p = .002). However, no significant
difference in mean mental demand were found in the uninformed surprise and startle
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emergency condition between single- and multi-engine aircraft (p > .016). These results
are depicted in Figure 8.

Figure 8. Mean mental demand for multi-engine and single-engine aircraft based on
emergency.

Physical demand post hoc results for main effect of emergency. Using the
Bonferroni post hoc, the mean physical demand of uninformed surprise emergency
(M = 8.69, SD = 4.18) was significantly lower than the mean physical demand of
uninformed surprise and startle emergency (M = 11.16, SD = 4.37, p < .001). The mean
physical demand of informed emergency (M = 8.55, SD = 4.56) was significantly lower
than the mean physical demand of the uninformed surprise and startle emergency
(p < .001). There was no significant difference in mean physical demand between the
uninformed surprise emergency and the informed emergency (p > .05). See Figure 9.
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Figure 9. Mean physical demand with error bars (standard error of the mean) based on
emergency.

Physical demand post hoc results for interaction (aircraft*emergency). Using a
paired sample t-test (testwise α = .016, Bonferroni adjustment), the mean physical
demand of the uninformed surprise and startle for multi-engine aircraft was significantly
higher than the mean physical demand of the uninformed surprise and startle and for
single-engine aircraft (p < .001). Similarly, mean physical demand of the informed
emergency for multi-engine aircraft was significantly higher than the mean physical
demand of the informed emergency for single-engine aircraft (p < .001). However, there
was no significant difference between the aircraft for the uninformed surprise condition
(p > .016). These results are depicted in Figure 10.
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Figure 10. Mean physical demand for multi-engine and single-engine aircraft based on
emergency.

Temporal demand post hoc results for main effect of emergency. Using the
Bonferroni post hoc, the mean temporal demand of uninformed surprise emergency
(M = 10.90, SD = 3.89) was significantly lower than the mean temporal demand of
uninformed surprise and startle emergency (M = 13.12, SD = 3.63, p < .001). The mean
temporal demand of informed emergency (M = 9.17, SD = 4.23) was significantly lower
than the mean temporal demand of uninformed surprise emergency (p = .002) and the
mean temporal demand of uninformed surprise and startle emergency (p < .001). See
Figure 11.
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Figure 11. Mean temporal demand with error bars (standard error of the mean) based on
emergency.

Temporal demand post hoc results for interaction (aircraft*emergency). Using
a paired sample t-test (testwise α = .016, Bonferroni adjustment), the mean temporal
demand of the uninformed surprise emergency for multi-engine aircraft was significantly
higher than the mean temporal demand of the uninformed surprise emergency for singleengine aircraft (p < .001). Similarly, the mean temporal demand of the informed
emergency for multi-engine aircraft was significantly higher than the mean temporal
demand of the informed emergency for single-engine aircraft (p = .003). However, no
significant differences were found in mean temporal demand in the uninformed surprise
and startle emergency condition between the single- and multi-engine aircraft (p > .016).
These results are depicted in Figure 12.
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Figure 12. Mean temporal demand for multi-engine and single-engine aircraft based on
emergency.

Subjective performance, effort, and frustration. Three separate 2 x 3 repeatedmeasures ANOVAs were run to assess the effects of aircraft and emergency on the
following dependent variables; (a) subjective performance, (b) effort, and (c) frustration.
The descriptive and inferential statistics are presented in Table 8 and 9 respectively.
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Table 8
Descriptive Statistics for Subjective Performance, Effort, and Frustration for Emergency
Condition and Aircraft
Multi-engine

Single-engine

M

SD

M

SD

Uninformed Surprise

15.20

4.78

13.03

4.91

Uninformed Surprise
and Startle

16.70

3.90

14.33

3.85

Informed

11.98

5.08

6.67

4.45

Total

14.63

3.19

11.34

3.29

Uninformed Surprise

12.70

4.40

10.67

4.42

Uninformed Surprise
and Startle

15.28

4.37

12.67

4.53

Informed Emergency

11.67

3.93

9.15

4.43

Total

13.22

3.35

10.83

3.88

Uninformed Surprise

13.15

5.33

9.75

5.67

Uninformed Surprise
and Startle

14.78

5.45

12.18

5.50

Informed

70.23

5.28

7.03

4.65

Total

12.72

4.70

9.65

4.51

Subjective Performance

Effort

Frustration

Note. N = 40. M = mean; SD = standard deviation.
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Table 9
Two-Way ANOVA Statistics for Subjective Performance, Effort, and Frustration
Dependent
Variable

ANOVA
Effect

MSE

F

df

p-value

ηp2

A**

646.82

23.01

1, 39

< .001

0.371

B**

842.20

66.00

2, 78

< .001

0.631

A x B*

61.20

3.60

2, 78

.032

0.082

A**

340.82

18.83

1, 39

< .001

0.331

B**

260.66

27.88

2, 78

< .001

0.411

A x Bns & a

2.26

0.25

1.73, 67.35

> .05

-

A**

564.27

39.93

1, 39

< .001

0.511

B**

474.72

44.16

2, 78

< .001

0.531

A x Bns

3.47

0.32

2, 78

> .05

-

Subjective
Performance

Effort

Frustration

Note. N = 40. A = aircraft; B = emergency; MSE = mean squared error; df = degrees of
freedom; ANOVA = analysis of variance; ηp2= partial eta square.
a
Assumption of sphericity violated, thus an adjustment to df was made using Greenhouse
Geisser. ns Not significant (p > .05). 1 large effect. 2 medium effect.

Subjective performance post hoc results for main effect of emergency. Using
the Bonferroni post hoc, the mean subjective performance of uninformed surprise
emergency (M = 14.11, SD = 3.19) was significantly lower than the mean performance of
uninformed surprise and startle emergency (M = 15.51, SD = 2.60, p .029). The mean
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subjective performance of informed emergency (M = 9.32, SD = 3.64) was significantly
lower than the mean subjective performance of uninformed surprise emergency
(p < .001) and the mean subjective performance of uninformed surprise and startle
emergency (p < .001). See Figure 13.
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Figure 13. Mean subjective performance with error bars (standard error of the mean)
based on emergency.

Subjective performance post hoc results for interaction (aircraft*emergency).
Using a paired sample t-test (testwise α = .016, Bonferroni adjustment), the mean
subjective performance of the uninformed surprise and startle emergency for multiengine aircraft was significantly higher than the mean subjective performance of the
uninformed surprise and startle emergency for single-engine aircraft (p = .013).
Similarly, the mean subjective performance of the informed emergency for multi-engine
aircraft was significantly higher than the mean subjective performance of the informed
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emergency for single-engine aircraft (p < .001). However, there was no significant
difference in mean subjective performance in the uninformed surprise emergency
condition between the single- and multi-engine aircraft (p > .016). These results are
depicted in Figure 14.

Figure 14. Mean subjective performance for multi-engine and single-engine aircraft
based on emergency.
Effort post hoc results for main effect of emergency. Using the Bonferroni post
hoc, the mean effort of uninformed surprise emergency (M = 11.69, SD = 3.59) was
significantly lower than the mean effort of uninformed surprise and startle emergency
(M = 13.97, SD = 3.61, p < .001). The mean effort of informed emergency
(M = 10.41, SD = 3.70) was significantly lower than the mean effort of uninformed
surprise emergency (p = .033) and the mean effort of uninformed surprise and startle
emergency (p < .001). See Figure 15.
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Figure 15. Mean effort with error bars (standard error of the mean) based on emergency.

Frustration post hoc results for main effect of emergency. Using the Bonferroni
post hoc, the mean frustration of uninformed surprise emergency (M = 11.45, SD = 4.76)
was significantly lower than the mean frustration of uninformed surprise and startle
emergency (M = 13.47, SD = 4.80, p = .001). The mean frustration of the informed
emergency (M = 8.62, SD = 4.69) was significantly lower than the mean frustration of the
uninformed surprise emergency (p < .001) and the mean frustration of uninformed
surprise and startle emergency (p < .001). See Figure 16.
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Figure 16. Mean frustration with error bars (standard error of the mean) based on
emergency.

Checklist Compliance Results for Single-Engine Aircraft
A one-way repeated measures ANOVA was conducted to test the null hypothesis
that there would be no significant difference in the number of checklist steps followed
among emergency conditions in the single-engine aircraft condition. The assumption of
sphericity was tested. Mauchly’s test of sphericity was not significant (p > .05). The
number of engine failure checklist steps followed between the emergencies significantly
varied, F(2, 78) = 106.10, p < .001, η2 = .73 (large effect size). The Bonferroni post hoc
showed that the mean number of checklist steps followed for uninformed surprise
emergency was significantly greater than the mean number of checklist steps followed for
uninformed surprise and startle emergency (p < .001). The mean number of checklist
steps followed for an informed emergency was significantly greater than the mean
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number of checklist steps followed for uninformed surprise emergency (p < .001) and
uninformed surprise and startle emergency (p < .001). The means and standard
deviations of the checklist steps followed based on emergency type are shown in Table 7.

Table 7
Descriptive Statistics for Mean Number of Checklist Steps Followed for Single-Engine
Aircraft
Emergency Condition

M

SD

Uninformed Surprise
Emergency

3.40

2.16

Uninformed Surprise
and Startle Emergency

1.82

1.63

Informed Emergency
6.80
1.80
Note. N = 40. M = Mean; SD = Standard Deviation.

Flight Performance Results for Multi-Engine Aircraft
A one-way repeated-measures ANOVA was conducted to test the null hypothesis
that there would be no significant difference in altitude deviation among the emergency
conditions. The assumption of sphericity was tested. Mauchly’s test of sphericity was
not significant (p > .05). The altitude deviation between the emergencies significantly
varied, F(2, 78) = 67.34, p < .001, η2 = .63 (large effect size). The Bonferroni post hoc
indicted that the mean altitude deviation for uninformed surprise emergency was
significantly less than the mean altitude deviation for uninformed surprise and startle
emergency (p = .043). The mean altitude deviation for an informed emergency was
significantly less than the mean altitude deviation for uninformed surprise emergency
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(p < .001) and uninformed surprise and startle emergency (p < .001). The means and
standard deviations of the altitude deviation for emergencies are depicted in Table 8.

Table 8
Descriptive Statistics for Altitude Deviation for Multi-Engine Aircraft
Emergency Condition

M

SD

Uninformed Surprise
Emergency

122.12

49.93

Uninformed Surprise
and Startle Emergency

147.77

46.43

Informed Emergency
27.35
50.32
Note. N = 40. M = Mean; SD = Standard Deviation.
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Chapter V
Discussion, Conclusions, and Recommendations
The results are discussed in this chapter by giving a wider insight into the possible
reasons for the findings. Since the topic under investigation is a relatively new area of
research, the researcher also suggests recommendations for future studies. This chapter
includes personal communication with the participants and experienced researchers to
help with the interpretation of the results.
Discussion
Manipulation check. A total of 22 participants (55 %) found the uninformed
surprise condition for the single-engine aircraft surprising, while 28 participants (65 %)
found it surprising for the multi-engine aircraft. However, 20 participants (50 %) found
the uninformed surprise and startle condition to be both surprising and startling for the
single-engine and the multi-engine aircraft. As discussed in Chapter 2, surprise and
startle are often used interchangeably, and further, the term surprise is sometimes used
interchangeably with startle. For example, Rivera et al. (2014) in a review of the ASRS
database found that the term startle is often not used to refer to startle but surprise.
Findings from Rivera et al. (2014) are consistent with this study where in the uninformed
surprise and startle condition, 8 participants (20 %) experienced surprise for the multiengine aircraft, while 10 participants (25 %) experienced surprise for the single-engine
aircraft. Surprise and startle are different constructs with different causes and effects.
Hence it is very important to distinguish between surprise and startle, otherwise, it can
lead to only partial understanding of the effects of surprise and startle on pilots during
unexpected events. If these effects are not distinguished and understood, it can
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potentially void the benefits of any training scenarios developed based on partial
understanding.
Twenty-eight participants (70 %) found the informed condition neither surprising
nor startling for the multi-engine aircraft, while 30 participants (75%) found the informed
condition neither surprising nor startling for the single-engine aircraft. For both aircraft,
the results were evident to show that the manipulation had worked on most participants.
However, a potential limitation of these results was that they are based on participant
perception and cannot reflect on how others in the population would perceive these
conditions.
Vital signs: Heart rate and respiration rate. As expected and consistent with
Bruna et al. (2018), respiration rate (RR) was higher for an uninformed emergency
compared to an informed emergency. Similarly, heart rate (HR) was also higher for the
uninformed emergency compared to an informed emergency, however, the results were
not consistent with Landman et al. (2017b), where no significant differences were found
between an informed and uninformed surprise emergency. The researcher would remind
the readers that Bruna et al. (2018) and Landman et al. (2017b) had airline pilots as their
sample; however, the current study had commercial pilots as its sample. Further, the
current study was the first to explore the effects of startle and surprise on commercial
pilots, and the results can be potentially generalized to the population. The results
categorized the uninformed emergency conditions as an uninformed surprise and
uninformed startle and surprise; and found that the HR and RR are higher for the
uninformed startle and surprise condition. The loud bang and thunder noise were
startling for most participants, especially participants flying the multi-engine aircraft
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where the average HR was 86.06 beats per min compared to a HR of 81.91 for the singleengine aircraft.
The mean HR of pilots flying the multi-engine aircraft was higher than the singleengine aircraft; see Table 4. Most participants agreed that the multi-engine aircraft was
harder to fly as they had to look at multiple instruments while flying ILS conditions. An
increased heart or respiration rate does not necessarily mean that the pilots were startled
or surprised, which is why the researcher asked all participants their perception of the
task. However, the manipulation check showed that pilots’ subjective perceptions were
generally consistent with the startle and surprise that the conditions were designed to
induce for each aircraft. One participant felt his “heart beating faster” when he heard the
loud bang, while another participant had sudden body movements when he heard the
thunder sound. The sudden body movements when the sounds were played were
consistent across most participants, something the researcher visually observed. The
results were also consistent with how the FAA and the EASA defined startle and surprise,
where startle is something associated with higher heart rate and surprise being something
different than the expectation.
NASA-TLX. The multi-engine aircraft was mentally and physically demanding
for most pilots. The researcher, based on his interaction with participants, offers one
possible explanation for this effect: since most commercial pilots fly the Cessna (singleengine) aircraft regularly, they are more comfortable with flying a Cessna as they have
more hours on that aircraft. It is possibly due to this reason that the mental and physical
workload for an informed emergency was significantly less for the single-engine aircraft.
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The mental demand was not different between the aircraft for the surprise and startle
condition. The loud bang and thunder noise were meant to startle the pilots, and startle is
associated with fear. It is highly unlikely that the fear due to the startling event will be
different if the pilot was flying a different aircraft.
The multi-engine aircraft was more physically demanding as the pilots had to
initiate a go-around; also in the informed emergency condition, the physical demand
scores were higher than in the uninformed surprise condition. Initiating a go-around with
engine failure is a physically demanding task, even if the condition is informed. The
temporal demand for the multi-engine aircraft was higher for the surprise emergency than
the surprise and startle emergency, which was something not expected. For the multiengine aircraft, 12 participants crashed the aircraft in the surprise condition, while 22
participants crashed the aircraft in the surprise and startle condition. Based on examining
the data again, it was found that 11 participants that crashed the multi-engine aircraft in
the surprise condition also crashed the aircraft again in the surprise and startle condition.
These participants did not perceive the temporal demand to be high for the surprise and
startle condition based on mere exposure as they were experiencing a similar outcome the
second time around, so they had acclimated to the situation.
Similarly, like mental demand, there was no difference in the temporal demand
between the aircraft for the uninformed surprise and startle emergency. It can be argued
that the initial behavioral response to fear would not vary with respect to whether the
pilot is flying a single- or multi-engine aircraft. For example, if a person hears a gunshot
which made him jump from his chair thinking what happened (mental demand) and run
(temporal demand), it does not really matter if the person was at home or at work.
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Subjective performance (self-assessed), as measured using the NASA-TLX, had
the highest score among the six subscales for both the aircraft. On average, most
participants rated their subjective performance as not up to their own standards except for
the informed condition for the single-engine aircraft, which had the lowest score among
all subscales for the informed condition. One participant, after flying the surprise and
startle condition for the multi-engine aircraft said, “I know how to feather and initiate
missed approach, but the loud bang interrupted me.” As per another participant, “the
thunder and lightning forced me to land quick and I was not looking at my altitude”,
when asked why, the participant replied, “I guess I was sure that I will see the runway,
but I never did.” The author believes that most pilots were very critical of their
performance; some even apologized and offered to re-fly the scenario. Based on personal
communication with the participants, the study found that most pilots that flew the singleengine informed condition found it relatively straight forward, as it is an emergency that
they have flown multiple times in a simulator. More specifically, participants that flew
this scenario as their last flight were happy that they ended the experiment on a good
note; one participant said, “finally I was able to do what I wanted to do, and there was no
disturbance.”
Effort and frustration significantly varied across the aircraft and emergency
conditions. For frustration, the researcher had not expected significant interactions for
frustration, which was corroborated by discussions with participants. One participant
suggested that “for me flying one aircraft over another is not frustrating as I need to build
my hours.” However, the researcher expected to find a significant interaction for effort,
especially after a significant interaction was found for mental and physical demand.
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There is no obvious explanation for this result, as some participants verbally suggested
that the multi-engine aircraft took more effort than the single-engine aircraft. It is one of
those cases where the difference was just not statistically significant, though the mean
effort for the multi-engine aircraft for all three emergency conditions was higher than the
single-engine aircraft; see Table 7.
Flight performance for single-engine aircraft (checklist steps followed). Since
the participants were not expecting an engine failure in the surprise condition, they may
not have been mentally prepared for the checklist, which was evident from the higher
mean number of checklist steps followed in the informed condition. The surprise and
startle condition further decreased the performance; 26 participants (65 %) in that
condition forgot to enrich the mixture before restarting the engine, while 20 participants
(50 %) failed to identify the landing field. The performance measured using the checklist
was consistent with the self-assessed performance for both the aircraft. Engine failure
training should incorporate startle and surprise as a factor. The results do signify that
having an informed engine-failure will result in high flight performance, but present
training will not necessarily transfer to situations where the pilots are faced with the same
emergency unexpectedly.
Flight performance for multi-engine aircraft (altitude deviation). Similar to
the single-engine aircraft, altitude deviation performance was better in the informed
condition, followed by the surprise condition, and the surprise and startle condition.
More than half the participants (N = 22) crashed their aircraft in the surprise and startle
condition; the engine-failure and the startle manipulation likely degraded conditions too
much for the participants. However, one participant who was not happy with his

69
performance said, “I was trying to find the runway and did not monitor my instruments
for about 10 to 15 s”, in these 10 to 15 s the aircraft had an engine failure, and the altitude
suddenly dropped, which led to the crash. All this went unnoticed by the participant, who
was busy trying to see the runway visually.
Practical Implications
The effects of startle and surprise are well documented; however, this topic is
under researched in the aviation industry. A study done on commercial pilots found that
simulator training can be helpful in mitigating the effects of startle (Gillen, 2016).
Similarly, studies also found that vital signs (respiration rate) and skin conductance
increase in surprise conditions (Bruna et al., 2018; Landman et al., 2017b). Based on
these studies, the research fraternity can agree that startle and surprise can affect
performance and vital signs, and that training can possibly help mitigate the negative
effects, which include inappropriate response during unexpected events not consistent
with training. However, the workload was not looked at by any of the previous studies.
Similarly, which simulator scenarios would be used for training, and for what aircraft?
This study tried answering those questions for commercial pilots, which represent 21.8 %
of the total pilot population in the U.S. It was found that flying a multi-engine aircraft
during surprise and startle events can lead to higher workload, HR, and RR. Similarly,
flying a single-engine aircraft in the uninformed surprise and startle condition can lead to
higher HR, RR, and workload.
The simulator scenarios proposed in this study can be potentially be used for
startle and surprise training for commercial pilots. The researcher believes that
classroom training along with simulator training can help to mitigate the adverse effects
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of unexpected events on pilot performance. The key factor in the successful
implementation of these simulator scenarios is that the pilots be uninformed about the
emergency. If pilots fly an informed emergency, their performance will be better (Bhana,
2010). The results of this study substantiated that claim, where pilots’ flight performance
was better in informed emergency conditions and more than 70% of the participants were
neither surprised nor startled while flying the informed emergency condition. However,
the flight performance deteriorated in the uninformed surprise condition and worsened in
the uninformed surprise and startle condition.
A potential contribution of this study was that the results suggested that heart rate
and respiration rate can be used as a physiological measurement for startle and surprise.
Further studies can record and evaluate heart rate and respiration rate to ascertain if the
simulator scenarios were startling or surprising as intended. Also, based on the results,
the researcher suggests that startle and surprise are not interchangeable terms in the
aviation industry, and that the research fraternity considers this concept. It is important to
understand that contradicting research on this topic cannot help with paving the way for
potential federal regulations.
This study identified that aircraft could be a factor during startle and surprise
events. Further, flying a surprise and startle emergency is more challenging than a
surprise emergency. Keeping the results of this study in mind, more simulator scenarios
should be proposed, something the FAA also suggested in its AC (2017).
Conclusions
For commercial pilots, the type of aircraft they are flying can impact their
performance, vital signs (HR and RR), and workload during surprising and startling
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events. It was evident from the results that HR and RR varied in response to emergency
conditions in similar patterns and increased from uninformed surprise conditions to the
uninformed surprise and startle condition. The workload did increase significantly and
was dependent on the aircraft and type of emergency. It was mentally and physically
harder to fly a multi-engine aircraft, as evidenced by higher levels of frustration and
effort. The key result of this study highlighted that having pilots fly informed emergency
scenarios is not a good idea because it might make the training predictable; something
with which Bhana (2010) agreed. The results of this study found that flight performance
was better when the pilots were flying informed emergency scenarios compared to when
they were flying uninformed emergency scenarios. The scenarios proposed in this study
were surprising and startling for most pilots and can be used for training pilots, provided
they are uninformed.
Recommendations
Vital signs. This study, along with past studies, recorded and evaluated vital
signs, which included HR, RR, and blood pressure. Past studies also recorded skin
conductance and heart rate variability. Ideally, future studies should focus on the same
measures for vital signs (HR, RR, blood pressure, and temperature) and try to validate the
designs of previous studies with a different population. However, the researcher highly
suggests that future studies should focus on electroencephalography evaluating the alpha,
beta, and gamma waves. Electroencephalography is used in physiological research to
evaluate the processing of complex stimuli (Biasiucci, Franceschiello, & Murray, 2019).
The results of these futures studies can help identify the brain wave patterns during
startling and surprising events on the flight deck, something no previous study has
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evaluated. Finally, electromyography is also a validated measure for startle (Blumenthal
et al., 2005; Khemka, Tzovara, Gerster, Quednow, & Bach, 2017), but has not been used
in any published aviation-related study so far.
Workload using the NASA-TLX. The current study was the first to assess pilot
workload using NASA-TLX for unexpected events that can surprise and startle pilots.
Future studies on this topic should use NASA-TLX to assess the pilot perception of the
workload. The researcher believes that most studies conducted on startle and surprise
from an aviation perspective did not employ any mechanisms to gather pilot perception
of the task. Future studies can ask pilots their perception of the tasks as a manipulation
check to establish if the scenario were surprising, startling, both or neither.
Sample size. Since few results were over-powered, the researcher recommends
that future studies should conduct power analysis, preferably Beta testing, to estimate
effect size for estimating sample size. The results for the six NASA-TLX factors, heart
rate, respiration rate were over-powered for the main effect of aircraft and emergency
scenarios. Similarly, the results for flight performance for both aircraft were also overpowered.
The results for all interactions had adequate power, so it is important to
understand that if the goal is to evaluate the interaction between aircraft and emergency,
then a sample of 40 is appropriate. However, if future studies only want to evaluate
aircraft or emergency, then a sample of 40 would result in over-powered results.
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